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THE TWIN FACES OF JUDICIAL CORRUPTION:
EXTORTION AND BRIBERY
IAN AYRES*
Men won't do much for a shilling.
For a pound they may be willing.
For twenty pounds the verdict's in the sack.'
INTRODUCTION
On January 25, 1990, I stood in a Cook County Circuit Court and accused
the presiding judge, the Honorable Thomas J. Maloney, of extortion. I was
filing a final amended post-conviction petition on behalf of Dino Titone.2
Titone had been convicted and sentenced to death in bench trials by Judge
Maloney for participating in the murders of Aldo Fratto and Tullio Infelise.3
My post-conviction petition alleged that Titone's own lawyer had solicited
money from Titone on behalf of Judge Maloney, and that Titone with the help
of his father had ultimately paid Judge Maloney $10,000." The petition al-
leged that after Judge Maloney received the money, an FBI investigation of
judicial corruption in Cook County-code name "Operation
Greylord"--became public and that Judge Maloney convicted and sentenced
Titone to death in order to cover up Maloney's felonious conduct.5
Accusing a sitting judge frightened me.6 And I brought my own counsel,
* William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. J.D., Yale University, 1986; Ph.D. in
Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988. Akhil Amar, Jennifer Brown, Tom Ger-
aghty, Gideon Parchamovsky, and Susan Rose-Ackerman provided helpful comments.
1. BERTOLT BRECHT, THE CAUCASIAN CHALK CIRCLE 102 (1947).
2. Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct mandates that "a lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents .... " Titone
has given me "permission to write, discuss and/or publish for any media any description, account,
opinion or other information or material about and relating to my prosecution or his subsequent
representation of me-except information covered by the attorney client privilege." Letter from
Dino Titone to author (Feb. 3, 1997) (on file with author).
3. People v. Titone, 505 N.E.2d 300, 300 (IIl. 1986) Two codefendants, Robert Gacho and
Joseph Sorrentino, were convicted in severed trials. Id.
4. The petition was based on affidavits of Titone and his father. The affidavits alleged that
money was paid to Titone's lawyer, Bruce Roth, who was to pass it along to Judge Maloney's
bagman, Robert McGee. People v. Titone, Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,
Ind. No. 83-127 (Cook County Ill. Cir. Ct., Jan. 25, 1990).
5. Id.
6. The requirement that post-conviction petitions (the Illinois analog to habeas corpus peti-
tions) must be heard before the original judge itself has an interesting history. The Illinois legis-
lature in its wisdom determined that post-conviction petitions should be heard before a new judge,
Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, 122-8 (1984 Supp.), but the Illinois
Supreme Court struck down this statute as violating the state constitution's separation of powers
limitation and held that the courts will determine the venue for post-conviction petitions without
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Tom Geraghty, in case Judge Maloney held me in contempt. When he read the
allegations,7 Maloney went ballistic. He forced me to answer a series of per-
sonal questions regarding my age and place of birth.
The case was ultimately transferred to another Circuit Court judge who
vacated Titone's death sentence8 but refused to grant Titone an evidentiary
hearing to establish his claim of judicial corruption. I unsuccessfully appealed
the latter ruling to the Illinois Supreme Court 9 -which brings me to the sub-
ject of this essay.
Even though I repeatedly characterized the deal between Judge Maloney
and my client as "extortion," the Illinois Supreme Court insisted on referring
to the underlying transaction as a "bribery conspiracy."' So which was it:
bribery or extortion? And should the characterization of a conspiracy as "brib-
ery" or "extortion" determine whether a convicted defendant earns a new trial?
My answers to these questions are straightforward. First, it will often be
impossible to distinguish "bribery" and "extortion," because conspiracies will
routinely combine elements of both deals. Second, deciding whether to grant a
new trial should not turn on this characterization. Any defendant who can
show that a judge accepted money (or negotiated for money) should be grant-
ed a new trial-regardless of whether the conspiracy seems more like bribery
or extortion.
The Titone case squarely presents this "convicted payor" prob-
lem"-whether a convicted payor should receive a new trial? But judicial
corruption creates at least two related problems: the "acquitted payor" problem
is whether an acquitted payor should be able to avoid a new trial (because of
the double jeopardy prohibition) and the "convicted non-payor" problem is
whether a convicted non-payor should receive a new trial (because of judicial
incentives to unfairly convict non-payors).'2
Unfortunately, Maloney's pattern of corrupt practice has raised all three of
these hypothetical problems not just in actual cases-but in murder cases. 3
legislative interference. People v. Joseph, 495 N.E.2d 501, 506 (IlI. 1986).
7. Along with the petition I simultaneously filed a motion to place the court papers under
seal, and a motion that Judge Maloney be removed for cause. Judge Maloney-without reading
any of the papers-initially resisted placing any of the documents under seal. He repeatedly asked
me to state in open court why I wanted the proceedings private. When I finally succeeded in get-
ting him to read a crucial paragraph of the complaint alleging judicial corruption, he then kept me
standing before him for twenty minutes as he carefully read the paper.
8. The judge found that Titone's own lawyer, Bruce Roth, intentionally sought the death
penalty for his client (in order to induce appellate courts to review the underlying conviction more
seriously). The judge found that this all-or-nothing strategy represented an abnegation of the ad-
versary process and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
9. People v. Titone, 600 N.E.2d 1160 (El. 1992).
10. Titone, 600 N.E.2d at 1164.
11. Even though this article describes Dino Titone as a "convicted payor," evidence suggests
that Titone's father was in fact the payor. Affidavit of Salvator Titone (Oct. 12, 1994).
12. Although this essay is focused on the issue of judicial corruption, the ideas also apply to
issues of juror or prosecutor corruption. Because jurors are not repeat players it will be more
difficult for them to establish a credible pattern of accepting bribes or extorting money. But the
actions of jurors (and the decision of prosecutors not to prosecute) are less reviewable than many
judicial decisions and hence may give these other actors more opportunity for corruption.
13. Maloney is one of 18 judges from the Cook County Circuit Court who have been con-
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Before taking the bench, lawyer Maloney facilitated the payment to a judge
who subsequently acquitted Harry Aleman of murder.' 4 In People v.
Aleman,"5 an Illinois district court struggled with the acquitted payor prob-
lem-whether the double jeopardy clause prohibited Aleman's retrial.' The
court held that double jeopardy protection did not apply in part because
Aleman faced no risk of conviction in the initial trial." This article, however,
will argue that Aleman's logic is incomplete. At a minimum, a court would
need more fact finding to conclude that double-jeopardy should not apply.
The United States Supreme Court is now grappling with the convicted
non-payor problem created by Judge Maloney's pattern of corruption. William
Bracy and Roger Collins were convicted of murder and sentenced to death in
a jury trial over which Judge Maloney presided. 8 Although "Itihere is no
suggestion that Bracy and Collins bribed or offered to bribe [Maloney],"'9 the
defendants seek a new trial arguing that Judge Maloney's corruption in other
cases gave him an incentive to be biased against defendants who did not pay
him-in part "to avoid suspicion that he was on the take."' ° Judge Richard
Posner rejected the defendants' substantive claims and even denied defendants'
claim for limited discovery to prove Judge Maloney's bias.2 The Supreme
Court subsequently granted certiorari in the case and at this writing has just
heard oral argument on the limited question of discovery. 2 The convicted
non-payor problem is admittedly vexing, but Judge Posner's opinion is unchar-
acteristically unnuanced-piling on arguments against the defendants' position
without seeing the benefit of at least granting limited discovery.
This essay is divided into three parts. In the first, I extend Jim Lindgren's
useful analysis of the difference between bribery and extortion. 3 Part II then
examines how courts should respond to motions for new trials when there is
an allegation of judicial corruption. Part I11 analyzes the acquitted payor prob-
lem raised in Aleman. And Part IV briefly analyzes the convicted non-payor
victed of corruption in the last decade. Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Rovner, J. dissenting), rev'd 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997), cert. granted sub nom. Collins v. Welborn,
117 S. Ct. 2450 (1997). Maloney "has the dubious distinction of being the only Illinois judge ever
convicted of fixing a murder case." Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1795 (1997).
14. People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996), appeal denied, 671 N.E.2d 734
(1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 986 (1997), habeas corpus denied sub nom., United States ex rel.
Aleman v. Circuit Court, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
15. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615.
16. Id. at 623-25.
17. Id. at 626.
18. Bracy, 81 F.3d 684.
19. Id. at 688.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Bracy, 117 S. Ct. 941. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Consider How the Taint of a
Corrupt Judge Should Be Measured and Remedied, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1997, at A18 (noting
that the Court granted certiorari only to consider whether petitioners were entitled to "discovery to
support his claim that he was denied the right to a trial before an impartial judge").
23. James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Com-
mon Law to the Hobbs, 35 UCLA L. REv. 815, (1988) [hereinafter Lindgren, Elusive Distinction];
James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1695 (1993) [hereinafter Lindgren, Theory.
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problem raised in Bracy.
2 4
I. A THEORY OF BRIBERY AND EXTORTION
In distinguishing between bribery and extortion, it is useful to distinguish
between procedure and substance. The crudest procedural theory would define
extortion as conspiracies initiated by judges and bribery as conspiracies initiat-
ed by defendants. 25 Of course, one can define words as one likes. But a
defendant's right to a new trial should not turn on who initiated a conversa-
tion. A procedural definition of bribery or extortion might only poorly corre-
late with the clean hands of a defendant. For example, if it becomes generally
known that judges take money, then defendants may feel pressure to initiate
the negotiation.26
Indeed, when intermediaries are involved, it may be very difficult to de-
cide which side initiated the negotiation. In the Titone case, Bruce Roth was
likely the instigator. But in beginning the negotiation, Roth (nominally
Titone's lawyer) might have been acting as Judge Maloney's agent--after all
Roth (who, like Maloney, served time for a pattern of corruption) had an
ongoing illicit relationship with several Cook County judges."
It is, however, possible to develop a substantive theory of bribery and
extortion that more clearly correlates with moral desert. Imagine a defendant
who in a fair trial-given the available evidence and the "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard-would have a 50% chance of conviction." For
such a defendant, a pure bribe would be an agreement to lower the probability
of conviction. As Jim Lindgren has succinctly defined: "Bribery consists of
paying for better than fair treatment."' By contrast, a judge extorting money
would threaten to unfairly increase the probability of conviction unless she
was paid. Under this definition, extortion consists of paying to avoid worse
than fair treatment.
Both extortion and bribery agreements entail payments from a defendant
24. Bracy, 81 F.3d 684. See Greenhouse, supra note 22.
25. In Evans v. United States, the Court held that
(1) there's no requirement of inducement for official extortion; (2) official extortion
doesn't require coercion; (3) bribery isn't a defense to extortion; (4) official extortion
isn't limited to false pretenses; and (5) the Government "need only show that a public
official has obtained a payment to which be was not entitled, knowing that the payment
was made in return for official acts."
Lindgren, Theory, supra note 23, at 1708 (quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268
(1992)). An inducement requirement could be related to a procedural definition of extortion to the
extent that inducement required the government official to initiate the negotiation.
26. Lindgren, Elusive Distinction, supra note 23, at 828.
27. United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1383 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. de-
nied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989). Bruce Roth, the defendant in this Greylord prosecution, was a crook-
ed lawyer. Id. He made a living bribing crooked judges. Id. Often Roth played the broker's role,
matching lawyers who did not know which judges would take money with judges who did not
know which lawyers would pay it. Id.
28. Titone was such a defendant. Titone had three alibi witness testifying on his behalf.
People v. Titone, 115 ll.2d 413, 425 (1986). The prosecution, in contrast, had only one, severely
impeached witness-an uncharged, admitted accomplice who had fled the jurisdiction-linking
Titone to the crime. People v. Titone, 505 N.E.2d 300, 300-01 (Ill. 1986).
29. Lindgren, Elusive Distinction, supra note 23, at 824.
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to a judge, but there is-in the lingo of classical contract theory-a different
substantive consideration. A substantive definition of bribery and extortion
asks whether the defendant was paying to receive better than fair treatment or
paying to avoid worse than fair treatment. The benchmark of expected treat-
ment in the absence of agreement is crucial." When a pure bribe is being
negotiated, the defendant expects in the absence of agreement to receive a fair
trial. When a pure extortion is being negotiated, the defendant expects in the
absence of agreement to receive an unfair trial.3 This substantive definition
is identical to the threat/offer dichotomy which has been so central to the
philosophical discussion of coercion.32
This substantive definition of bribery and extortion illuminates the moral
desert of the payor/defendant. The judge's action in agreeing to receive money
is morally repugnant regardless of whether the agreement is an extortion or a
bribe. But from the payor's perspective, paying to receive better than fair
treatment is clearly more repugnant than paying to avoid unfair treatment. If
we could nicely separate judicial corruption into these two boxes, we might
want to treat more favorably a defendant who paid to avoid injustice than
someone who was purchasing injustice (in her favor).33
30. See Alan Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENy. U. L. REv. 889,
900 (1997) (discussing moralized baseline). Fred McChesney has powerfully analyzed the poten-
tial for government shakedowns backed by the threat of unjust treatment. Fred S. McChesney,
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEG. STUD. 101
(1987).
31. Jim Lindgren's two articles on bribery and extortion are path-breaking. He clearly sees
the clean, substantive distinction between bribery and extortion, but then needlessly muddies the
listinction by unhelpfully complicating the definition of extortion:
[C]oercive extortion by a public official is the seeking or receiving of a corrupt benefit
paid under an implicit or explicit threat to give the payor worse than fair treatment or to
make the payor worse off than he is now or worse than he expects to be.... Thus,
while bribery has only one baseline (fair treatment), coercive extortion has at least three
baselines (fair treatment, expected treatment, and the status quo).
Lindgren, Theory, supra note 23, at 1701. Lindgren's triple benchmark for extortion leads him to
unhelpfully find an "overlap" between bribery and extortion:
Now what about government officials who have a duty to arrest criminals? Here coer-
cive extortion and bribery overlap. If a police officer suggests that he will not arrest a
criminal if he is paid off, this is extortion, because he is threatening to make the crimi-
nal worse off than he is now. But it's also bribery, because the criminal is paying hush
money for more than fair treatment.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Lindgren, Elusive Distinction, supra note 23, at 827. It seems
more useful to describe this hypothetical as a pure bribe. Fair treatment would be for the official
to arrest the criminal; here, the criminal is purchasing better than fair treatment. The criminal's
actions are no less repugnant because the official was threatening to change the status quo. Indeed,
the status quo was that the criminal was rightfully subject to arrest--so that threatening arrest is
not clearly a change in the status quo. Like Lindgren, I will argue that pure bribery and extortion
are often combined in the same agreement, see infra p. 35, but Lindgren's hypothetical is not a
good example of this blending.
32. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, Moralized Theories of Coercion: A Critical Analysis, 74
DENy. U. L. REV. 907 (1997).
33. There are three types of favorable treatment that might be afforded criminal defendants
that pay an extortion:
1. if they were originally convicted, we might be more willing to grant them a new trial;
2. if they were originally acquitted, we might be less willing to retry them; or
3. we might be less likely to prosecute them for participating in judicial corruption.
The second possibility will be discussed in the acquitted payor section.
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Unfortunately, there are strong structural reasons why we should often
expect to see combinations of bribery and extortion. Just as a consumer could
simultaneously buy a hamburger and a soda, a defendant's payment to a judge
will often be for the purpose of both (1) avoiding worse than fair treatment (if
the payment is not made) and (2) inducing better than fair treatment (if the
payment is made).' Philosophers have already seen the possibility of these
combined "threat" and "offer" and conveniently dubbed them "throffers.
35
But previous authors have not seen that there are strong reasons to suspect
that each side will prefer agreeing to a combination of bribery and extortion
instead of a pure extortion agreement--even if the price to be paid does not
change. It is easy to see that the defendant/payor would prefer to purchase
better than fair treatment for the same price-not only because it is better to
be assured acquittal, but also because structurally it will often be easier for the
defendant to verify whether the judge is performing her side of the bargain.
Under what I have defined as pure extortion, the judge upon payment merely
agrees to judge fairly. But it will often be difficult to objectively assess what
is fair treatment. If a judge after agreeing to pure extortion goes ahead and
convicts in a bench trial, it will often be difficult for the defendant to know
whether the conviction was warranted.
What is somewhat more surprising is that the judge might prefer a combi-
nation of bribery and extortion to simple extortion-even if the size of the
defendant's payment does not change. Assuring the defendant's acquit-
tal--regardless of the evidence-is likely to reduce the chance that an unsatis-
fied customer will complain to the authorities. If the judge merely extorts,
defendants who are fairly convicted are more likely to inform authorities about
the illicit agreements. By gratuitously combining bribery together with extor-
tion, extorting judges reduce the chance that a defendant will testify against
them.
This, however, is not an a priori proof that all extortion agreements will
be combined with bribery. In some cases, an extorting judge would be disinc-
lined to assure acquittal because doing so would tip off investigators. 6 When
the threat that third-parties will uncover judicial corruption is low, there are
strong reasons to suspect that combined agreements will tend to dominate
either pure bribery or pure extortion.37 Extorting judges will tend to overshoot
34. Lindgren clearly saw this possibility. Lindgren, Theory, supra note 23, at 1700 ("The
same envelope filled with cash can be both a payment extorted under a threat of unfairly negative
treatment and a bribe obtained under a promise of unfairly positive treatment."); see also Lind-
gren, Elusive Distinction, supra note 23, at 826.
35. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCIoN 204 (1987); MIcHAEL TAYLOR, CoMMuNrrY, AN-
ARCHY, AND IBERTY 12 (1982).
36. Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 689-90 (7th Cir. 1996). The court stated:
While a corrupt judge might decide to tilt sharply to the prosecution in cases in which
he was not taking bribes-to right the balance as it were--it is equally possible that he
would fear that by doing so he would create a pattern of inconsistent rulings that would
lead people to suspect he was on the take.
Id. Also the foregoing arguments ignore the impact that criminal law of bribery and extortion
itself can have on the parties. For example, if judges and/or defendants were subject to higher
penalties for combination agreements, combined agreements might not dominate extortion agree-
ments.
37. It's harder to say that bribery agreements will tend to throw in extortion elements. My
1236 [Vol. 74:4
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in the defendant's favor-providing not just a fair trial but assuring acquittal.
As the threat of third party scrutiny increases however, judges will have
smaller incentives to assure acquittal. For example, when the Operation
Greylord investigation became public, corrupt judges suddenly began to fear
federal scrutiny more than the possibility that defendants would turn them in.
Even judges who had entered into pure bribery agreements might prefer to
overshoot in breaching their agreements-not merely retreating to a fair trial,
but convicting regardless of the evidence. Judge Posner has suggested that
unusually harsh judicial conduct may tip off authorities just as much as unusu-
ally lenient conduct. 3 But with regard to discretionary decisions-such as
whether to convict in a bench tria-a corrupt judge is much more likely to
divert investigative attention by calling close decisions against the defendant.
This analysis of judicial incentives should inform our normative rule-
making. First, we should realize that even when there is evidence of bribery, it
may be part and parcel of a defendant's effort to avoid injustice if money is
not paid. And second, the possibility that an extorting judge could insist on
giving better than fair treatment reduces the defendant's moral culpability for
participating in a combination of bribery and extortion. If paying to avoid
unfair treatment is excusable, the payment becomes no less excusable if the
judge, for her own reasons, wants to make sure that the defendant is acquitted.
Here, I may part company with Jim Lindgren who has suggested that "there is
no reason to let off a briber just because he was also a victim of extortion. 39
Finally, a dramatic increase in the threat of third party detection may lead
judges to convict the very defendants who had paid them money. Many people
ask me why my client would have been unjustly convicted if he had paid the
judge money. The increased threat of federal scrutiny provides the answer.
When judges have more to fear from third-party detection than from a defen-
dant disclosing a payment, they may decide that the safer course is to convict
regardless of the evidence.'
Even if a defendant was morally culpable for entering into a pure bribe,
the slow, public development of Operation Greylord raises the possibility that
she would receive worse than fair treatment from the very judge she paid. It
may be appropriate to separately punish a defendant for agreeing to
bribe-and my previous argument suggested why such pure bribes would be
difficult to identify-but we can no longer be confident that the underlying
convictions of paying defendants are just.
earlier argument was that if the parties were inclined to enter into an extortion agreement, they
would routinely throw in an agreement for assured acquittal if the money were paid. But having
agreed to a bribe (i.e., assured acquittal), it is harder to think what it would mean to combine ele-
ments of extortion.
38. Bracy, 81 F.3d at 689-90; see infra text accompanying note 51.
39. Lindgren, Theory, supra note 23, at 1700; see also Lindgren, Elusive Distinction, supra
note 23, at 826. Lindgren, however, was not considering the specific context of judicial corruption
in criminal cases. Given our general constitutional protection for criminal defendants, I imagine
that Lindgren might well agree with the thesis of this paper that defendants who had entered into
combination deals should receive new trials.
40. Indeed, once the first wave of Greylord indictments became public judges could say that
defendants claiming to have paid money were merely concocting stories of judicial corruption.
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A potentially stronger way to distinguish instances of bribery from inst-
ances of extortion--that is to say instances where the defendant/payor is more
culpable for paying a judge-is to independently assess the probability of
conviction at a fair trial. If the probability of conviction at a fair trial was
virtually nil, then we might be confident that the defendant/payor was only
being extorted-for example, paying money to avoid an unfair conviction. On
the other hand, if the probability of conviction (given the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt) was virtually certain, we might be confident that
the defendant/payor was only bribing the judge for better than fair treatment.
As the benchmark of uncorrupted treatment tends toward one extreme or the
other (certain acquittal or conviction), there is only "room" to sell one type of
consideration. But such independent assessment amounts to a quasi-retrial.
II. WHEN SHOULD A CONVICTED PAYOR RECEIVE A NEw TRIAL?
Always. Whenever a judge takes money, or negotiates to take money, the
defendant should receive a new trial. The characterization of the agreement as
extortion or bribery should not matter. Unfortunately, this is not the current
state of the law. Courts tend to require that a convicted defendant show not
merely that the judge accepted money, but that the judge's corruption caused
judicial error. This section will argue that this prejudice requirement is an
inappropriate vestige of our concern that bribers not profit from their bribe.
In People v. Titone,1 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a preliminary
claim42 that Titone should be given a new trial because of Judge Maloney's
corruption.43 The Court adopted the dual requirements of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Shaw v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" that:
(1) "petitioner must establish a nexus between the activities being
investigated and the trial judge's conduct at trial"; and
(2) "petitioner must establish actual bias resulting from the trial
judge's extrajudicial conduct."'45
While unartfully drafted and somewhat redundant, the Shaw standard seems to
require a showing that corruption caused error.
This requirement should be rejected because it cannot be squared with a
long line of Supreme Court holdings on judicial bias. For example, in Aetna
Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,' the Supreme Court held that a justice was
acting as a "judge in his own case:' when he participated in proceedings where
the decision directly affected a case that the justice had independently filed.4'
The Supreme Court made clear that it was not required to decide whether in
41. 600 N.E.2d 1160 (Ill. 1992).
42. Titone has renewed his claim based on additional evidence of Judge Maloney's corrup-
tion.
43. People v. Titone, 600 N.E.2d 1160, 1166 (Il. 1992).
44. 580 A.2d 1379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
45. Titone, 600 N.E.2d at 1166 (citing Shaw v. Commonwealth of Pa., 580 A.2d 1379, 1381
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)).
46. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
47. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986).
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fact the justice was influenced, but only whether sitting on the case "would
offer a possible temptation to the average ... judge" leading the judge "not to
hold the balance nice, clear and true." The Due Process Clause "may some-
times bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their best
to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties." 49 But to
perform its high function in the best way, "justice must satisfy the appearance
of justice."
Judge Posner, with his usual clarity, has elucidated the concept of judicial
bias:
[Jiudicial bias is one of those "structural defects in the constitution of
the trial mechanism," as distinct from mere "trial errors," that auto-
matically entitle a petitioner for habeas corpus to a new trial. What is
bias? Defined broadly enough, it is a synonym for predisposition, and
no one supposes that judges are blank slates. There are prosecution-
minded judges, and defense-minded judges, and both sorts have pre-
dispositions-biases that place an added burden on one side or the
other of the cases that come before them. Yet no one supposes that
the existence of such biases justifies reversal in cases where no harm-
ful errors are committed. The category of judicial bias is ordinarily
limited to those predispositions, real or strongly presumed, that arise
from some connection pecuniary or otherwise between the judge and
one or more of the participants in the litigation .... [F]or bias to be
an automatic ground for the reversal of a criminal conviction the
defendant must show either the actuality, rather than just the appear-
ance, of judicial bias, "or a possible temptation so severe that we
might presume an actual, substantial incentive to be biased."'
But as argued above, a judge who has taken money may have a substantial
incentive to be biased to convict-to avoid third-party detection or to punish a
defendant who the judge feels has not fully performed (read: paid). This lib-
erty incentive is much stronger than the financial incentives involved in Aetna
or Tumey.
Yet the Shaw standard requires a convicted defendant to prove more in
the case of corruption-induced bias than the Supreme Court's Aetna decision
required in the case of financially induced bias. I believe this disparate treat-
ment is a continuing vestige of the concern that defendants should not benefit
by their bribery.52 The additional requirement in Shaw that corruption cause
48. Id. at 825 (citations omitted), discussed in Ruling on Petitioners' Motion for Post-Con-
viction Relief, at 12, People v. Hawkins & People v. Fields, Nos. 85-C-6555 & 85-C-7651 (Cook
County Ill. Cir. Ct., Sept. 18, 1996) (Dooling, J.).
49. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825.
50. Id.
51. Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Del Vecchio v. Illinois
Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1380 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
52. Ruling on Petitioners' Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, at 16, People v. Hawkins &
People v. Fields, Nos. 85-C-6555 & 85-C-7651 (noting that "those who attempt to corrupt the
judicial system may not later hide behind the very constitution they subvert"); see also Akhil Reed
Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLIJM. L. REv. 1, 55
(1995).
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error cannot be explained by a smaller judicial temptation-if anything, a
judge who has received money has much more at stake. Instead, I believe the
causal error requirement in Shaw and Titone grows out of a misguided sense
that the requirement will distinguish failed extortion deals from failed bribery
deals; a briber who is convicted has nothing to complain about unless she can
show judicial error. Yet, the causal error requirement is unlikely to distinguish
failed bribery and failed extortion agreements. The two types of agrements
will often be combined and judges involved in either pure bribery or extortion
may have incentives to convict regardless of the evidence in order to divert
attention (or punish incomplete defendant performance).
Thus, even for courts that do not explicitly base their analysis on the
distinction between bribery and extortion, the perceived dirty-hands of defen-
dants who pay judges-evidenced in part by the Illinois Supreme Court's
repeated characterization of Titone's claim as a "bribery" conspiracy even
though I repeatedly characterized it as an extortion conspiracy-lead courts to
impose harsher prerequisites for new trial.
Titone and Shaw should be overruled and those jurisdictions should in-
stead follow the Third and Fifth Circuits, which have come closer to giving
per se relief to convicted defendants who have established that they have paid
off judges or jurors. For example, in United States v. Forrest,1
3 the Fifth Cir-
cuit granted a new trial to a defendant who had attempted to tamper with a
jury. And in Zilich v. Reid,54 the Third Circuit remanded for an evidentiary
hearing on the voluntariness of a defendant's guilty plea where the defendant
alleged he was promised a sentence of probation in exchange for a $4,000
bribe to a trial judge.5 Where surrender of a fundamental constitutional right
is concerned, the court's inquiry should not focus upon the "clean hands of the
defendant.
5 6
My preferred new trial standard would make everything turn on whether a
payment was made, or on whether an unreported payment negotiation oc-
curred. Accordingly, much will turn on what evidence is required to prove that
it is more likely than not that a judge was paid. This should remain an open-
ended (and conventional) question of fact, but Titone has provided sufficient
evidence.
The Titone case is clearly not a "me too" allegation of corrup-
tion-cobbled together only after Judge Maloney was indicted in the Greylord
sweep. Rather, Titone was the first to accuse Judge Maloney of extortion."
Moreover, key facts in our accusation preceded and paralleled the proof be-
yond reasonable doubt that later convicted Judge Maloney of extortion from
other defendants." In 1990, Titone alleged that Judge Maloney had been paid
53. 620 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1980).
54. 36 F.3d 317 (3d Cir. 1994).
55. Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1994).
56. Ruling on Petitioners' Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, at 18, People v. Hawkins &
People v. Fields, Nos. 85-C-6555 & 85-C-7651.
57. People v. Titone, Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Ind. No. 83-127
(Cook County Ill. Cir. CL, Jan. 25, 1990).
58. Id.
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$10,000 in Titone's murder case, the payment was made through Maloney's
bagman Robert McGee, and Judge Maloney convicted Titone to divert the
attention of federal Greylord investigators. 9 It was not until 1991 that Judge
Maloney was indicted for extortion. The evidence establishing Judge
Maloney's extortion of Earl Hawkins is eerily similar. The government alleged
that Judge Maloney received $10,000 from the defendant in a murder case,
that Robert McGee served as Judge Maloney's bagman, and that Judge
Maloney convicted Hawkins to divert Greylord investigators.'
More important, one of the lead Greylord prosecutors, Scott T. Mendeloff,
has sworn in an affidavit that Titone's father, Salvatore Titone, was the first to
identify Judge Maloney's bagman:
At the time Salvatore Titone gave his proffer in 1990, the
government's investigation had not yet established that McGee acted
as "bagman" for Maloney. It was only two years after Salvatore
Titone first provided information regarding McGee's role as a
"bagman" for Judge Maloney, that William Swano first identified
McGee as Maloney's bagman.6
While a showing of judicial error or trial misconduct should not be a
separate prerequisite for retrial, such judicial misconduct is certainly probative
of judicial corruption. And indeed such misconduct is present in the Titone
case. Strong evidence shows that after convicting Titone, Judge Maloney told
Titone's lawyer, Bruce Roth, not to take a bench trial for the sentencing stage
(of the bifurcated litigation) because Judge Maloney would sentence Titone to
death.62 This admonishment is probative of a prior deal. Judge Maloney, in
effect, was telling Roth that Maloney would have to sentence Titone to death
in order to avoid investigation.63
Yet in the face of all this circumstantial evidence, the Illinois courts have
refused to grant Titone an evidentiary hearing or limited discovery to prove
his allegations. At such a hearing Judge Maloney, Robert McGee and Bruce
Roth would likely invoke their Fifth Amendment rights, allowing a trier of
fact to infer an agreement from their refusal to speak.64
59. Id.
60. Superseding Indictment, U.S. v. Thomas J. Maloney, Robert McGee and William A.
Swano, 91 CONG. REC. 477 (June 25, 1991).
61. Affidavit of Assistant United States Attorney, Scott Mendeloff, at 1 5 (Oct. 12, 1994),
appended to Fourth Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, People v. Titone, No. 83-127
(Cook County nIl. Cir. Ct., Oct. 12, 1994).
62. Findings of Circuit Judge Earl Strayhorn, People v. Titone, Ind. No. 83-127 (Cook Coun-
ty Ill. Cir. Ct., Sept. 7, 1990) (vacating Titone's death sentence).
63. Judge Maloney wanted to avoid deciding; if a jury decided, Judge Maloney could not
be blamed for the result by either Titone or the federal investigators. Trying to induce Titone to
opt for a sentencing jury was Maloney's way of balancing the threat of Titone going public
against the threat of federal scrutiny.
64. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-20 (1976) (stating that in civil proceedings the
Fifth Amendment does not forbid fact finders from drawing an adverse inference). If state courts
continue to deny an evidentiary hearing, Titone should file a § 1983 or RICO suit against Judge
Maloney-in part to force Judge Maloney in deposition to face the question of whether he or his
bagman received money from Titone. Titone's ability to file a civil action now, however, may be
hampered by the statute of limitations or by qualified judicial immunity.
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II. WHEN SHOULD AN ACQUITrED PAYOR AvoID A NEW TRIAL?
The last section explored how courts should respond when a pay-
or/defendant attacks a conviction because of judicial corruption, but prosecu-
tors may have a parallel incentive to attack acquittals that are the product of
judicial corruption. While the double jeopardy clause normally precludes an
acquitted defendant from being retried for the same offense, Akhil Amar and
Jonathan Marcus have suggested that a defendant who pays for an acquittal
(pursuant to what I have called a pure bribe agreement) may not deserve the
same constitutional protection.' Amar and Marcus consider the hypothetical
of "a defendant on trial for murder bribes his jury and wins acquittal, and in a
subsequent prosecution this bribery is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Judge Maloney's corrupt ways have forced an Illinois court to grapple with a
very similar fact pattern.
In 1977, Thomas J. Maloney was not yet a judge, but he played a crucial
role in brokering a corruption deal between his client Harry Aleman and Judge
Frank Wilson.' Judge Wilson ultimately acquitted Aleman of murder charges
in a bench trial.' Fifteen years later, the State reindicted Aleman for the
same murder. In response to Aleman's motion to dismiss the indictment, the
State argued that double jeopardy was inapplicable because Aleman had paid
Judge Wilson $10,000 to acquit him.'
In this subsequent proceeding, the trial court found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Judge Wilson had been bribed during the 1977 trial. The court
refused to dismiss the second indictment and an Illinois appellate court af-
firmed. ° In what it characterized as being an issue of first impression,7' the
appellate court adopted without citation the basic argument of Amar and
Marcus (published a year earlier in the Columbia Law Review) 72-holding
that Aleman could be retried.
Amar and Marcus suggest that a bribery exception to the double jeopardy
clause might be grounded in part on the concept of risk:
If the jury was bribed, the defendant was never truly in jeopardy. The
fix was in, and he ran no risk, suffered no jeopardy-from the
French jeu-perdre, a game that one might lose, and the Middle Eng-
lish iuparti, an uncertain game. On this theory, a second trial would
65. Amar & Marcus, supra note 52, at 54-57.
66. Id. at 55.
67. Maloney was Aleman's counsel when the agreement with Judge Wilson was struck and
Maloney subsequently withdrew from the case at Judge Wilson's request because the two were
such close friends that Judge Wilson did not want to show favoritism in a case in which Maloney
was the defense attorney. Id. at 3.
68. See People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ill. App. CL 1996).
69. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d at 617.
70. Id. at 627.
71. The court noted: "No case has been cited by Aleman or the State involving the applica-
tion of double jeopardy principles to circumstances presented here: the alleged bribery of a judge
resulting in acquittal of a defendant who the state seeks to retry for the same offense." Id. at 623.
72. Amar & Marcus, supra note 52. Amar tells me that he also informally advised the pros-
ecutor in the case.
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truly put defendant in jeopardy not "twice" but only once, in keeping
with the textual command.73
The Aleman decision similarly emphasized risk: "Of particular importance here
is that '[jJeopardy denotes risk. In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes
the risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution."'"4 The
court ultimately concluded:
Given [the defendant's] involvement in the bribery of Judge Wilson
in order to procure an acquittal in his 1977 murder trial, we conclude
that Aleman clearly was not subject to the risk normally associated
with a criminal prosecution. The principles of double jeopardy do not
bar the instant reindictment and reprosecution."
The Court seems to reason that once the judge was paid there was no risk of
conviction.
But this reasoning is flawed for two reasons. First, both the appellate
court and Amar and Marcus ignore the possibility of extortion. If the agree-
ment concerned pure extortion, then full performance of the agreement would
have exposed the defendant to exactly the same risk that would have been
"normally associated with a criminal prosecution." Accordingly, there should
not be a double jeopardy exception with regard to pure extortion agreements.
The Aleman opinion cites to enough testimony to suggest that the sub-
stantive consideration for the $10,000 was at least in part bribery (a promise to
acquit regardless of the evidence).76 But as argued previously, there are
strong structural reasons to expect that extortion agreements will often be
combined with bribery agreements. The court's failure to mention the rele-
vance of extortion (in subjecting defendant to risk of conviction) suggests that
they did not consider this possibility in undertaking its fact finding.
Second, the court's (and the authors') risk reasoning is flawed because it
does not consider the defendant's risk of "diverting" or "retaliatory" convic-
tions. Even if the substantive agreement was a pure bribe or a combination of
bribery and extortion, the defendant risked conviction because the judge might
breach the agreement "in order to cover up and conceal original payments of
the bribe" or to retaliate against a perceived breach on the part of the defen-
dant. Judge Maloney's later reaction to the Operation Greylord investigation
vividly illustrates how a judge who has promised (and been paid) to acquit
might nonetheless convict in order to divert third-party scrutiny. These are not
just the allegations of Dino Titone, but parallel allegations were proven be-
73. Id. at 55 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
74. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d at 624 (emphasis in original) (quoting Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
528 (1975)). The court similarly concluded for double jeopardy to apply "that a defendant must be
'subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction."' Id. at 624 (quoting Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
75. Id. at 626.
76. For example, before his initial trial, Aleman had told Vincent Rizza (a former Chicago
police officer and bookmaker) that "his murder indictment 'was all taken care of,' and that 'com-
mitting murder in Chicago was okay if you killed the right people."' Id. at 618.
77. Ruling on Petitioners' Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, at 5, People v. Hawkins &
People v. Fields, Nos. 85-C-6555 & 85-C-7651.
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yond a reasonable doubt at Judge Maloney's criminal trial with regard to
Maloney's conviction of Earl Hawkins and Nathson Fields."
Moreover, the risk of a "retaliatory" or "disgruntled" conviction can be
found in the Aleman's decision own description of Judge Wilson's conversa-
tions with Robert Cooley, a lawyer for "the mob in Chicago" who had per-
sonally negotiated the initial $10,000 deal:
On the second day of trial, Judge Wilson and Cooley met. Wilson
was very upset and voiced his concern that the case was not as weak
as Cooley had initially represented.... Cooley met Wilson again.
Wilson was even more upset this time because the prosecutors had
informed him that a witness was receiving $10,000 for testifying
falsely. Wilson was amazed that he was only receiving $10,000 al-
though he was a "full circuit judge." Wilson explained that he may
lose his job and asserted, "that's all I get is ten thousand dollars? I
think I deserve more." Wilson blamed Cooley because he would
receive "all kinds of heat" for this trial. He again requested more
bribe money. Cooley told Wilson he would see what he could do.'
Even though the court found that "Wilson never expressed any intention not to
fulfill his end of the deal," the judge's repeated concern and upset and his
repeated attempts to bargain for more money (especially after learning that a
mere witness was being paid the same amount) created a risk that Wilson
might have convicted the defendant notwithstanding the agreement."
A closer look at the facts suggests that bribery is far from a sure thing.
Even though Amar and Marcus imagine that when the "fix was in, [a defen-
dant] ran no risk,"82 Chicago's unhappy history of corruption teaches, there
are unlikely to be easy "no risk" cases to fit a double jeopardy exception.
Instead, courts will need to grapple with how much risk and what kinds of risk
are sufficient to put a defendant in jeopardy."3
Indeed, Amar and Marcus might respond that the risk of "retaliatory" or
78. Id.; United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1995).
79. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d at 619.
80. Id.
81. If the agreement had been a sale of goods, there would be a sufficient risk of Wilson's
non-performance that Aleman would have reasonable grounds for seeking additional assurances.
U.C.C. § 2-608 (1994).
82. Amar & Marcus, supra note 52, at 55.
83. David Rudstein has previously argued that bribery does not eliminate the risk of convic-
tion:
[A] judge bribed by the defendant in a bench trial might change his mind after the start
of the trial, return the bribe money, and, after hearing all the evidence, convict her. Or
the judge might double-cross the accused and convict her while keeping the bribe mon-
ey.... In none of these situations can it be argued that, because the defendant paid off
the judge ... prior to her trial, she was never in "jeopardy" at her trial. For she in fact
was convicted.... Thus, even in a case in which the defendant bribed the judge in a
bench trial, one or more jurors, or the prosecutor, she still runs the risk-albeit a re-
duced one-of being convicted.
David S. Rudstein, Double Jeopardy and the Fraudulently Obtained Acquittal, 60 MO. L. REV.
607, 639-40 (1995). Rudstein backs up his analysis, of course, by discussing Judge Maloney's
willingness to convict and sentence to death defendants who had paid him money. Id. at 640
n.136.
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"diverting" conviction does not count as a double jeopardy risk because only
the risk of conviction at a fair trial counts in the constitutional calculus. For
example, in discussing race-stacking, the authors suggest that "a stacked jury
is, constitutionally speaking, no jury; its acquittal, no acquittal; and so defen-
dant ... was never constitutionally in jeopardy."'"
This argument, however, ignores the realities of the last section. Defen-
dants like Aleman not only ran the risk of initial conviction, but they ran the
substantial risk that any conviction would be affirmed on appeal."3 In the cur-
rent world, a convicted defendant in Illinois has virtually no chance of win-
ning even an evidentiary hearing or limited discovery to establish that her
judge had received money. Regardless of what Amar and Marcus have in
mind as minimal requisites for a fair trial, Illinois courts are currently likely to
affirm convictions where a judge has taken money.'
Our assessment of whether Aleman was at risk in this initial trial must
then turn not only on the likelihood of his being convicted at trial, but also on
the likelihood that appellate courts would affirm when confronted with allega-
tions that the judge had taken money. If Illinois changed its current law and
began automatically granting new trials where paying defendants were convict-
ed (as suggested in the previous section), there would be a much stronger case
for a bribery exception to the double jeopardy rule-that is granting new trials
where paying defendants are acquitted.'
The Illinois court's disparate treatment of the "convicted payor" and the
"acquitted payor" problem is dramatically shown in the following passage
from Aleman in which the court asks: "[Was the defendant] not subjected to
'the risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution'? The
answer must be in the affirmative considering analogous circumstances.""
The analogous circumstances to which the Aleman court is referring are the
pecuniary interests cases discussed above-including Lavoie and Tumey. s9
84. Amar & Marcus, supra note 52, at 56.
85. It is inconsistent to treat corrupt acquittals as a nullity when corrupt convictions are
treated as being valid.
86. As Rudstein has noted:
[No appellate court would accept the claim by the defendant that her conviction should
be reversed because a crooked judge, a corrupt juror, or a dishonest prosecutor failed to
keep his end of the bargain and acquit her, vote to acquit her, or present a weak case
against her, respectively.
Id. at 640.
87. Defendants would still run the risk that after being convicted they would not be able to
prove that the judge had been paid.
88. A/eman, 667 N.E.2d at 624 (quoting Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975)).
89. The analogous circumstances are detailed in this annotated string citation that follows the
passage quoted in the text
See Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (invalidating a judgment
of the Alabama Supreme Court because a justice on that court was a party to a similar
case pending in an Alabama trial court and, therefore, the judge's pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the case required new proceedings); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528
(1975) (where pecuniary interests of judges have been involved in the cases, the results
must be invalidated); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (recognizing that
"[flaimess of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our sys-
tem of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this
end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where
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Bizarrely, these pro-defendant constitutional holdings are not sufficient to
nullify Titone's conviction (or even assure him an evidentiary hearing) but
they are sufficient to nullify Aleman's acquittal-notwithstanding the double
jeopardy clause to the Illinois and United States constitutions.
Amar and Marcus, however, identify the defendant's malfeasance as a
second possible basis for a bribery exception: "Call it what you
wii--stoppe , frau, unclean hands, waiver, or forfeiture-the basic idea,
rooted in general legal principles, is that defendant's own prior misconduct
bars him from asserting a double jeopardy claim."" The authors admirably
identify what is lurking below the surface of corruption cases. They explain
that this line of argument "never gets to the Double Jeopardy Clause. It simply
prevents a defendant from raising the issue."'
But as a normative matter, a defendant's prior misconduct by itself should
not be sufficient to nullify the effect of an initial acquittal. First, it will often
be difficult to determine the defendant's culpability. As emphasized above,
judges will routinely insist on combining elements of bribery and extortion. A
defendant who agrees to bribe as part and parcel of a deal to avoid unfair
treatment is less culpable than the image of a pure briber that the Aleman
court and Amar and Marcus have in mind. And at times it will be unclear
whether the defendant or a third-party negotiated and paid the judge.'
To clarify the interaction of risk and estoppel, it is useful to consider two
stylized hypotheticals. In the first, imagine that (unbeknownst to a defendant)
the defendant's sibling enters into a pure bribe with a judge who subsequently
acquits the defendant.93 In the second, imagine a defendant who pays his law-
yer to bribe the judge, but unbeknownst to the defendant the lawyer pockets
the money and at a fair trial the defendant is acquitted. In the first case, there
is no risk of conviction, but no defendant misconduct. In the second, there is
defendant misconduct, but the normal risk of conviction. I cannot imagine a
theory that would allow retrial under the second scenario.94 Defendant mis-
conduct may be a necessary condition for a bribery exception but it should not
be a sufficient condition.
he has an interest in the outcome"); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 521-32 (1927) (hold-
ing that defendant was entitled to a new trial where the trial judge received $12 by stat-
ute for each case which resulted in a conviction because "officers acting in a judicial...
capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided..
Id. at 625-26 (parallel cites omitted).
90. Amar & Marcus, supra note 52, at 55.
91. Id.
92. In the Aleman case, there is some uncertainty about the extent to which Aleman, himself,
knew about and/or participated in the judicial corruption. The opinion merely says that two "1st
Ward figures Pat Marcy and John D'Arco, Sr." asked Robert Cooley ("a former Chicago police
officer and an attomey") "if he 'had a judge at 26th Street who could handle or take care of a
case."' Aleman, 667 N.E.2d at 618. It was Cooley who negotiated the deal with Judge Wilson.
Even the opinion indicates that Aleman had illegal dealings with Cooley and Aleman bragged that
"his murder indictment 'was all taken care of.'" Id. It is not clear that Aleman instigated the deal
or knew of it in advance.
93. Akhil Amar in private conversation suggested this line of argument.
94. I can imagine, however, prosecuting the defendant for the independent crime of attempt-
ed bribery.
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In sum, like Amar and Marcus, I can imagine a narrow bribery exception
to a defendant's normal double jeopardy protection that turns on a prosecutor
proving not only that money was paid but that (a) the payment virtually elimi-
nated the risk of conviction at the initial trial and that (b) defendant is culpa-
ble for this initial corruption. But corruption Chicago-style teaches that pur-
chasing a judge does not guarantee acquittal. Particularly in jurisdictions that
make it extremely difficult for convicted payors to receive new trials, we
should make it extremely difficult for prosecutors to retry acquitted payors.
Indeed, this section has shown that proving that a judge was paid falls far
short of proving the defendant was culpable or not at risk. Given the grave
difficulties involved in proving these elements, the Double Jeopardy Clause
may be better served without admitting a bribery exception.
The acquitted payor and the convicted payor problems need to be an-
swered together. Giving the convicted payor an absolute right to a new trial,
while subjecting the acquitted payor to a relatively small risk of retrial might
induce more defendants to try to bribe judges. But the social cost of the con-
victed payor rule is relatively small: an absolute right to a new trial will often
only mean an absolute right to be convicted a second time. Barring
reprosecutions of acquitted payors may more substantially increase defendants'
incentives to bribe. Yet a rule making it difficult to reprosecute acquitted
payors might also reduce judges' incentives to extort or accept bribes. An
acquitted payor would have more freedom under such a rule to subsequently
disclose the identity of corrupt judges. This is not to say that these proposed
rules would not have predictable costs. It is only to suggest that the cost in
increased corruption may not be as great as it initially appears.
IV. WHEN SHOULD A CONVICTED NON-PAYOR RECEIVE A NEW TRIAL?
This section analyzes a much more difficult problem created by Judge
Maloney's corruption-a problem with which Judge Posner recently grappled
and for which the United Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari. In
Bracy v. Gramley,95 defendants who were convicted and sentenced to death
by Judge Maloney sought a new trial because they did not have (nor did they
ever discuss) a deal with Judge Maloney." The defendants claimed that
Judge Maloney had an incentive to convict defendants who did not pay him in
order to (1) divert the attention of prosecutors and the electorate and (2) to
create a reputation as a tough judge so as to more easily extort money from
defendants who did pay.' At this point, it might be useful to point out that
Judge Maloney sentenced more people to death than any other judge in Cook
County."
95. Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 1996).
96. Bracy, 81 F.3d at 688.
97. Id.
98. An Assistant United States Attorney, Scott Mendeloff, described Maloney's reputation for
ruthlessness:
As a judge [Maloney] was tough and hard-nosed.... But one of the things that I have
heard over and over again from lawyers in the community is thai he took it far too far,
that he was ruthless; that he heartlessly meted out sentences without any compassion.
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In one sense, the Bracy defendants' claim is more sympathetic than
Titone's because there is no possibility that they participated in a bribery
conspiracy. The Titone and Aleman decisions show how defendants' miscon-
duct might make courts less likely to grant them a new trial or more likely to
grant the prosecutor a new trial. The Bracy facts put to the test whether a
defendant's clean hands can lead to a more lenient judicial approach.
T1he case is difficult, however, because it leads to an a1--or-nothing result
for a potentially large class of defendants. Indeed, as Judge Posner observed
while rejecting the defendants' claim, a rule of automatic reversal "would thus
require the invalidating of tens of thousands of civil and criminal judgments,
since Judge Maloney alone presided over some 6,000 cases during the course
of his judicial career and he is only one of eighteen Illinois judges who have
been convicted of accepting bribes."
While the case presents a difficult problem, Judge Posner's decision sys-
tematically minimizes the benefits and overstates the cost of granting relief.
His rhetorical strategy makes a hard case seem implausibly easy. Posner mini-
mizes the benefits of granting a new trial by arguing that it is unlikely that
Judge Maloney would have unjustly convicted the defendant: "The fact that
Maloney had an incentive to favor the prosecution in cases in which he was
not bribed does not mean that he did favor the prosecution in such cases more
than he would have done anyway."'"o It is striking to hear one of the parents
of law and economics argue that incentives do not, on the margin, affect be-
havior.
And Judge Posner even questions whether Judge Maloney on net would
have an incentive to unjustly convict:
While a corrupt judge might decide to tilt sharply to the prosecution
in cases in which he was not taking bribes--to right the balance as it
were-it is equally possible that he would fear that by doing so he
would create a pattern of inconsistent rulings that would lead people
to suspect he was on the take."0
The only time there was compassion that we can see has to do with the times in which
money was being passed.
Bracy, 81 F.3d at 700 n.1 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Thomas J. Maloney &
Robert McGee, No. 91 CR 477, Sentencing Tr. 559-60 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 1994) (remarks of As-
sistant United States Attorney Scott Mendeloff)).
99. Id. at 689. During oral argument, Justice O'Connor echoed this concern: "This judge
handled 6,000 criminal cases. By [defendants') standard, they are all out the window. We're talk-
ing about a lot of cases." Greenhouse, supra note 22, at 18.
100. Bracy, 81 F.3d at 689.
101. Id. at 689-90 (emphasis added). During oral argument before the Supreme Court, Justice
Scalia has echoed Judge Posner's concern:
Justice Antonin Scalia, who said that Mr. Bracy's case "rests on a series of assumptions
that are not necessarily self-evident."
Addressing Mr. Levy, the inmate's lawyer, Justice Scalia said he thought it just
as likely that rather than punishing those who did not pay bribes, a judge taking bribes
to favor some defendants would be lenient in other cases as well to avoid calling atten-
tion to his behavior.
"He would look worse if he were a hanging judge in most cases and a bleeding
heart in some," Justice Scalia said, adding: 'The fact that he was dishonest when he was
given money doesn't mean he was dishonest when he was not given money."
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This cannot be true. On the margin, it would benefit Judge Maloney (finan-
cially, in avoiding prosecution, and in winning reelection) to decide all close
or discretionary questions against such defendants.'"0
Finally, Judge Posner minimizes the benefits of granting new trials by
assuming that such defendants are guilty: "[T]he automatic rule must be inter-
preted circumspectly, with due recognition of the cost to society of overturning
the convictions of the guilty in order to vindicate an abstract interest in proce-
dural fairness."' 3 But given Judge Maloney's predisposition for corruption,
how can Judge Posner be so sure that he would be "overturning the convic-
tions of the guilty"?
Against the "abstract interests in procedural fairness," Judge Posner sees a
parade of horrible consequences. As earlier quoted, Judge Posner imagines that
thousands of cases would need to be reopened. But his analysis is inflated
because many of the defendants would have served their complete sentence (or
it might be possible to limit new trials to defendants convicted while Judge
Maloney was known to be engaged in a pattern of corruption). 4
Judge Posner also suggests that granting new trials in this case might
require granting new trials for any defendant when the judge is facing reelec-
tion:
The assumption underlying [defendants'] argument is that a judge's
corruption is likely to permeate his judicial conduct rather than be
encapsulated in the particular cases in which he takes bribes. The
assumption is plausible but the consequences are unacceptable. If we
were to inquire into the motives that lead some judges to favor the
prosecution, we might be led, and quickly too, to the radical but not
absurd conclusion that any system of elected judges is inherently
unfair because it contaminates judicial motives with base political
calculations that frequently include a desire to be seen as "tough" on
crime.'05
But as a doctrinal matter, it is easy to distinguish reelection bias from extor-
tion bias. Judge Posner himself notes that courts entertain a general presump-
Greenhouse, supra note 22, at 18.
102. As Judge Rovner observed:
A judge who wishes to be tough on the defendant need not adopt the manner of the
Tasmanian Devil to do it. Maloney was by no account stupid. .... [I]f he wanted to
cultivate a pro-prosecution record to protect his interests as a bribetaker, he had the
ability to do so discretely, without appearing to have abused his discretion as a trial
judge. . . . In this case there were plenty of issues that implicated Judge Maloney's
discretion and thus his ability to influence the case against Bracy and Collins: the credi-
bility questions presented by the petitioners' motion to suppress key evidence; the bol-
stering of prosecution witnesses; the collateral impeachment of defense witnesses; im-
proper prosecution argument to the jury; the denial of a continuance prior to the sen-
tencing hearing; and the refusal to sever the sentencing hearings.
Bracy, 81 F.3d at 698-99, 701 n.3 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 689.
104. However, given Maloney's willingness to broker corrupt deals as a lawyer in Aleman,
Maloney's pattern of corruption may have extended through out his judicial tenure.
105. Bracy, 81 F.3d at 689.
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tion that "judicial officers perform their duties faithfully."" Posner admits
that this presumption is "obviously inapplicable" under the facts of Bracy, but
it could still adequately distinguish reelection bias.
A more balanced assessment would admit the difficulty of the problem. It
might be more consistent with general judicial bias precedents to grant new
trials to any defendant convicted while a judge was engaged in a pattern of
rcccivhig money. But at a minimum, courts should vacate the most important
discretionary decisions of Judge Maloney that disfavored defendants-in par-
ticular, sentences and bench trial convictions. Or one might place a burden on
the prosecution to prove that there was such overwhelming evidence of guilt
that any judicial misconduct was harmless. In any event, defendants convicted
by Judge Maloney should automatically be given an evidentiary hearing and a
right to ask Judge Maloney under oath whether his pattern of judicial corrup-
tion affected their case. Sadly, both the Titone and Bracy litigation show that
victims of Judge Maloney's extortion rarely can convince Illinois courts that
they have good cause to be permitted either discovery or an evidentiary hear-
ing.
CONCLUSION
Thomas Maloney's malfeasance in a murder case provides a pragmatic
lens through which to evaluate the three core problems of judicial corruption:
concerning the convicted payor, the acquitted payor and the convicted
nonpayor.1°
In this paper I have presented a theory to substantively distinguish bribery
and extortion, and suggested reasons why bribery will often be combined with
extortion. However, this article's more important insights are not derived from
theory, but from what can be learned from the judicial corruption unearthed by
Operation Greylord: Defendants who paid judges still ran substantial risks of
conviction. Judges used the continuing threat of conviction to renegotiate
higher bribes (as in Aleman) and judges convicted to divert the Operation
Greylord investigation (as in Titone, Hawkins and Fields).
These insights throw new light on the "convicted payor" and the "acquit-
ted payor" problem. Understanding that a paid judge might convict notwith-
standing the evidence diminishes our confidence in such convictions and
strongly argues for granting such defendants new trials. It also suggests that
retrying an acquitted payor does create double jeopardy problems because
there is always some risk that a paid judge will convict notwithstanding the
106. Id. at 688 (citing Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1372-73
(7th Cir. 1994)).
107. The three covered categories suggest a fourth problem of judicial corruption concerning
acquitted non-payors: to wit, when can an acquitted non-payor be reprosecuted notwithstanding
the Double Jeopardy Clause? While it would seem obvious that the correct answer should be
"never," the logic of Judge Posner's Bracy opinion might suggest otherwise. If it is "equally possi-
ble" that a corrupt judge would avoid "creat[ing] a pattern of inconsistent rulings" by acquitting
non-payors, Bracy, 81 F.3d at 689, then Posner might argue that prosecutors should have a right
to attack the validity of acquittals not procured by payment. Hopefully readers can see that the
errors in this argument further undermine the persuasiveness of Posner's original decision.
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payment.
Dino Titone and Thomas Maloney are currently both in prison. Titone is
awaiting resentencing on his murder conviction and has filed a subsequent
post-conviction petition seeking a new trial based on additional compelling
evidence of Judge Maloney's extortion. Judge Maloney is serving a 15-year
sentence for his pattern of bribery and extortion.
In rejecting the claims in Bracy, Judge Posner said that the defendants'
death sentences were legally irrelevant to the question of whether they should
receive new trials: "The fact that this is a death case magnifies the appearance
of impropriety but is irrelevant to an issue that goes to the propriety of con-
viction rather than merely to that of the sentence."'" Should our society be
willing to execute someone where the convicting judge was paid money?
There are strong reasons to believe that (1) there was agreement between
Titone and Maloney; (2) the agreement involved elements of extortion;"°
and (3) Judge Maloney had reasons to convict Titone regardless of the evi-
dence. I cannot fathom a justice system that would deny him an evidentiary
hearing to prove these allegations and, if proven, grant him a new trial.
Judge Maloney is despicable. He repeatedly sold his office in death penal-
ty cases for a pittance. It sickens me that I had to submit myself to his author-
ity. Judge Maloney, where were you born?
108. Bracy, 81 F.3d at 689.
109. Maloney's willingness to extort-backed up by his willingness to convict notwithstand-
ing the evidence if he was not paid-is vividly illustrated in his treatment of lawyer William
Swano. As described by Judge Rovner in her Bracy dissent
mhe notion that Maloney was deliberately tough on defendants who did not bribe him
finds support in the testimony presented at Maloney's trial. Defense attorney William
Swano arranged several of the bribes for which Maloney was prosecuted and was a key
government witness against him. In 1985, Swano represented James Davis, whom the
state had charged with armed robbery. The case was assigned to Maloney for trial. By
this time, Swano had already bribed Maloney on a number of occasions. But after in-
vestigating the prosecution's case against Davis, Swano concluded that it would be un-
necessary to bribe Maloney in order to obtain an acquittal in this case: three witnesses to
the robbery knew the two perpetrators and said that Davis was not one of them; Davis
had an alibi; and the victim of the crime, who had initially identified Davis as one of the
perpetrators, had confessed uncertainty about the identification. Swano was confident
that "the case was a not guilty in any courtroom in the building." United States v.
Thomas J. Maloney and Robert McGee, No. 91 CR 477, Tr. 2528 (N.D. III. March 24,
1993). To Swano's surprise, however, Maloney convicted his client after a bench trial.
Swano took this as a lesson that "to practice in front of Judge Maloney ... we had to
pay." Tr. 2530.... One may infer from Swano's testimony that Maloney saw the Davis
prosecution, in which no bribe was tendered, as an opportunity to teach Swano a lesson
that would ensure bribes in future cases.... [F]ixed cases were a source of illicit profit,
whereas unfixed cases were an opportunity, as Bracy puts it, to "advertise" in the de-
fense bar (Bracy Reply at 1).
Id. at 697 (Rovner, J., dissenting). While Judge Rovner acutely understands that Maloney used the
Davis case to induce Swano to pay in future cases, she insists on referring to these payments as
"bribes" instead of "extortion."
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POSTSCRIPT
Good news. Since drafting the initial essay, subsequent decisions in
Bracy, Titone and Aleman have moved toward more fully protecting
defendants' constitutional right to an impartial judge."'
The Supreme Court reversed Judge Posner's Bracy opinion."' Justice
Rehnquist writing for an unanimous court found Bracy had established "good
cause" for discovery on his claim of actual bias." 2 The opinion left unan-
swered what Bracy would need to prove to win a new trial, but at the very
least the court found the "Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
establishes a constitutional floor" for "a judge's qualifications to hear a
case.""' Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the petitioner had met his burden
not only because "Maloney was shown to be thoroughly steeped in corrup-
tion," but also because petitioner had provided evidence suggesting "that
Maloney was actually biased in petitioner's own case.""' 4 Thus, the opinion
stops short of creating a per se discovery rule for any defendants convicted
during Maloney's reign of corruption.
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Bracy, Illinois Circuit
Court Judge Earl Strayhom decided to vacate Tit6ne's murder conviction and
grant a new trial." 5 Judge Strayhorn's decision is remarkable not only proce-
durally-because the judge granted Titone's motion on the papers without an
evidentiary hearing-but also substantively. After quoting Judge Rovner's
eloquent dissent in Bracy,"6 Judge Strayhorn expressed the disquiet the
Titone case had caused him:
I cannot truly articulate the pain that I have borne in listening to the
horrible things that went on in this case in what is supposed to be a
courtroom of law and justice. And no amount of procrastination on
my part, no amount of reluctance on my part can wipe out the fact
that under the circumstances that have been presented here what went
on in that courtroom as to Dino Titone was not justice. And that Dino
Titone did not receive the kind of a fair, impartial trial before a fair,
110. Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997); People v. Titone, Circuit Court of Cook
County, Ind. No. 83 C 127, Report of Proceedings heard before the Honorable Earl E. Strayhom
(July 25, 1997) [hereinafter Titone Proceedings]; United States ex rel. Aleman v. Circuit Court of
Cook County, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. nIl. 1997).
111. Bracy, 117 S. Ct. at 1796. 1 had overnight mailed a draft of this paper to each of the
justices shortly before this opinion was announced.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1797.
114. Id. at 1799.
115. Titone Proceedings, supra note 110.
116. The court in Bracy stated:
No right is more fundamental to the notion of a fair trial than the right to an impartial
judge. "The truth pronounced by Justinian more than a thousand years ago, that 'impar-
tiality is the life of justice,' is just as valid today as it was then." The constitutions of
our nation and of our states, the rules of evidence and of procedure, and 200 years of
case law promise a full panoply of rights to the accused. But ultimately the guarantee of
these rights is no stronger than the integrity and fairness of the judge to whom the trial
is entrusted.
Bracy, 81 F.3d at 696 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Brown, 539 F.2d 467, 469
(5th Cir. 1976)).
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unbiased, impartial judge that his constitutional right as a citizen
required."'
The State of Illinois in its wisdom has chosen not to appeal this decision and
the parties are preparing for a new trial." 8 Judge Strayhom's words capture
the simple idea that we can no longer have confidence that convictions of paid
judges are the product of the defendant's guilt and not instead some effort to
divert suspicion or bargain for more money.
Finally, Harry Aleman's claim has for the first time been considered by a
federal court. Judge Suzanne Conlan denied Aleman's petition for habeas
corpus, thereby upholding his reprosecution." 9 But in so doing, the court at
least acknowledged that paying a judge does not extinguish the risk of con-
viction:
While Aleman did not completely eliminate the risk of conviction,
Aleman dramatically and illegally altered the playing field on which
the decision would be made. It is sufficient that "Aleman clearly was
not subject to the risk normally associated with a criminal prosecu-
tion." Aleman II, 667 N.E.2d at 626. For that reason alone, jeopardy
did not attach in Aleman's 1977 trial.' 20
While this decision represents an improvement over the previous court's risk
analysis, the decision continues to ignore the possibility of pure extor-
tion--which would have subjected the paying defendant to exactly the same
risk "normally associated with a criminal prosecution." And Maloney's own
response to the evolving Greylord investigation suggests that even bribing
defendants may be subjected to a risk that is not only substantial, but possibly
greater than that of a fair trial. The Aleman decision is much more defensible
in a world where convicted payors, like Titone, are also retried-but still more
attention needs to be given to assess the quantum and quality of risk to which
the acquitted paying defendants are exposed.
The Supreme Court's Bracy opinion avoids the dreaded e-word. Bracy
had explicitly argued that Maloney might have convicted non-payors notwith-
standing the evidence in order both (1) to deflect suspicion that he was taking
money in other cases and (2) to better extort money in other cases.'' But
Rehnquist could not bring himself to consider the second possibility. Even
though there was substantial evidence that Maloney extorted money from
defendants,'22 Rehnquist-like the judges in Titone and Aleman--could not
conceive of the possibility that defendants would pay judges to avoid unfair
treatment. Until we are willing to admit the possibility of extortion as well as
bribery, we are unlikely to respond properly to the multifaceted problems of
judicial corruption.
117. Titone Proceedings, supra note 110, at 12.
118. Conversation with Thomas Geraghty (Sept. 18, 1997).
119. United States ex rel. Aleman v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D.
1i. 1997).
120. Id. at 1026 (citation omitted).
121. See Bracy, 81 F.3d at 697 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
122. See supra note 109.
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